Philosopher Tricks--Demand for Theory

As usual, we assume we have a theory that is highly suspect or otherwise obviously inadequate, and we want to avoid conclusive refutation. Suppose our theory is that moral claims are true if and only if Tim Tebow asserts them (the Gator Command theory).

One reasonable way to evaluate a claim about which you are in doubt is to define the claim and then try to argue against it (no kidding!). There are innumerable ways to argue for or against a claim, but one method stands out for how cheap and easy it is, and thus is to be preferred over all others. And that is to demand a theory of the objection to our position and then counterexample (or otherwise refute) that definition.

The correctness of a theory of X is only weakly relevant to the truth of X. If you can develop a good theory of X you can help dispel doubts that X might be an illusion or that the reasons for belief in X are an error of some kind. But a failure to have a theory of X does not mean that X is not real. Indeed, theorizing about the nature of X must come after recognition of the existence or reality of X. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to give a coherent, complete theory of any philosophically interesting item X (or even many uninteresting ones).

Wittgenstein, as we know, made this point, and it doesn't apply just to the Socratic questions about piety, virtue, etc. It applies in even mundane contexts. There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a game, but it does not follow that there is no such thing as a game. Play the game game yourself. Try to think of anything that all and only games have in common. There are lots of necessary conditions (e.g. being an activity), and lots of sufficient conditions (e.g. being scrabble), but no set of conditions that are jointly sufficient but individually necessary. If you play this game, and find it frustrating, you may realize that even being fun is not necessary for something to be a game.

Or, consider sports. Is there anything that all and only sports have in common? Here's a definition of "sport" from freedictionary.com "Physical activity that is governed by a set of rules or customs and often engaged in competitively." (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/sport)

This is too broad. Construction work is a physical activity, and it is governed by rules. Note the open-ended part of the definition "often engaged in competitively". Just about any physical activity can be engaged in competitively. There are competitive eating contests (hence, physical activities), but eating isn't a sport.

In retrospect, it is obvious that demands for a theory will often fail to be met, not because the item in question does not exist, but because either we cannot figure out what set of conditions make it what it is, or because there is no set of such conditions. This error is obvious, yet it is often overlooked.

My first example is from Russ Shafer-Landau in his introductory article on Ethical Subjectivism in Reason and Responsibility. Shafer-Landau makes exactly this demand-for-a-theory argument against moral realism, saying that one reason against it is that there is no adequate theory of objective moral facts. But the fact that we cannot completely define and explain the existence of objective moral facts does not mean there aren't any; in fact, it's not even much evidence that there aren't any. This inability to give a theory of moral facts could simply reflect our well-known inability to give a complete and correct theory of much of anything.

Here's a case in which a philosopher defends a problematic theory. Brian McLaughlin, writing in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, on the topic of Epiphenomenalism, the view that the mind or mental properties (or types) are causally irrelevant, notes that many critics of epiphenomenalism claim that it creates insuperable problems of reference to and knowledge of the mental. But, McLaughlin claims, such a criticism would require that a causal theory of reference or knowledge be correct, and there are problems with causal theories of reference and knowledge.

The problem with McLaughlin's claim is obvious. To say that it is necessary that some particular (concrete, abstract, whatever) be causally relevant to one's belief/utterance in order for that belief to count as knowledge/for that utterance to refer is not to claim that a causal theory of knowledge or reference is correct. I may think that theories of any such thing are impossible to attain, but I may also think that causation is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge or reference (to concrete particulars). So the lack of causation would undermine the possibility of knowledge/reference even though there would not be a causal theory of either.

I don't have a causal theory of sitting, but I'm fairly sure that a necessary condition for one to be sitting on something is that the thing you are sitting on be causally related to you. I don't have a "height" theory of basketball prowess, but I'll wager that being over 3 feet tall is a necessary condition for making it in the NBA (damn you, NBA!).

My final example comes from an article, "Teleology and the Nature of Mental States," in the American Philosophical Quarterly by Scott Sehon.

Sehon argues for a teleological view of action-explanation and, based on that theory, argues against functionalism. The discussion relevant to my point is Sehon's response to the obvious Davidsonian point that nothing can constitute an explanation of behavior unless it is causally responsible for that behavior. Only causation can turn the and of "Jamie was jealous and broke up with his girlfriend" to the because of "Jamie broke up with his girlfriend because he was jealous."

Sehon claims that in order to support the claim that causation is necessary for a correct teleological explanation for behavior, one must believe that a causal analysis of teleological explanations is at least possible. But, he claims, one cannot give such an analysis, primarily because causation is not sufficient for teleology. In other words, one’s mental state can cause a behavior in a deviant way so that we would not say that the behavior was done intentionally but the mental state nonetheless caused it.

There are two glaring problems with this argument. First, no one need claim that there is a causal analysis of intentional action in order to think that causation is necessary for that action. The second problem, related to the first, is that to say that X is necessary for Y (while not implying that there is a theory of Y in terms of X) does not mean that X is also sufficient for Y. So, showing that X is not in fact sufficient for Y has literally no bearing on the claim about X’s necessity for Y.

So, why would anyone make these arguments? Why demand a theory of whatever-it-is that is thought to render your theory inadequate? Because it’s easier than addressing the real issue. Sehon could very easily show that causation is not necessary for an explanation of action if he could give an example in which the supposed intention is not actually a cause but does nonetheless provide a correct intentional explanation. Obviously, there is no such example.

Now we can protect our theory from refutation by always demanding a theory of our objector for whatever theory we propose. So, now, when someone objects that our Gator Command theory of morality implies that Tebow would have no reason for his commands, we can say: To conclude that the Gator's commands are not based on reason is to assume that there could be an objective theory of reasons in morality against which the Gator's commands are to be judged. But given that there is no such theory, this objection provides no basis to undermine our view. Now, declare victory and go home.

William Kristol, the Bullshitter

William Kristol, in Harry Frankfurt's technical terms, is a bullshitter or bullshit artist. This means that Kristol has no interest in the truth; he is not even lying when he makes claims or arguments since to lie one has to care what the truth is and attempt to make someone believe its negation. Kristol has no interest in the truth at all; he will, quite simply, say anything at all if he believes it will benefit himself and his "side" of any particular issue. It is for this reason that Kristol should never be invited on any television program or to write any opinion article. It's not that he's wrong, disastrously wrong, a lying weasel, or complicit in the deaths of thousands of American troops or tens, or hundreds, of thousands of Iraqis. These are terrible and crimes against humanity. But the reason he should never be invited to speak in public is that there is no connection between things he says and any reason or fact at all. In order to be a positive contributor to the public discourse, and, therefore, in order for it to be reasonable for any television program, newspaper, magazine, blog or random-crazy-person-ranting-in-the-street, to rely on Kristol for anything--including not just expertise on issues but even opinion or contrarianism, it must be that such a person makes an effort to connect his/her assertions with some evidence, fact or reason. One need not believe everything one says in order to be taken seriously, but if there is no expectation that one's claims will have anything to do with reality, then we would all be better off generating statements from random word lists. At least those might have comedic value. The only value of seeing or reading Kristol is as an emetic. I am, of course, not advocating taking away Kristol's right to free speech. He is just as free as I am to blog or rant incoherently on the streets. I do object to anyone providing him a platform for his bullshit. And our entire media establishment seems hell-bent on providing him that platform despite his already having control of an influential conservative magazine.

The impetus for my writing comes from his recent appearance on the Daily Show ("a mouthpiece for the right") in which he claims an analogy between Sarah Palin resigning as governor of Alaska and Barack Obama resigning his senate seat in order to be President (and others taking other offices in the Obama administration--strangely I have never noticed Kristol taking Republicans to task for this offense). In other words, Kristol claims that accepting a promotion is the same thing as quitting your job.

This is obviously a false analogy, and no one with even a moment's thought or an ounce of integrity would make such a preposterous claim. This example alone ought to explain my attitude toward Kristol. There are, of course, an indefinitely large supply of similar examples even during that one interview. However, I should say precisely what is wrong with the analogy.

There is an implied contractual agreement among politicians when they run for office and the public who votes for (or against) them. Among the implicit agreements is the agreement that the public official will serve his/her designated time in office. And this explains the general disdain people have for Palin resigning. She had no adequate justification for stepping down; there simply was no reason for her to break this implicit contract. It is not enough that one want to earn more money or that one wants to avoid public criticism or that one wants to go on speaking tours or one wants to work less or avoid a place of work that one finds uncongenial. If Palin did seriously believe based upon good evidence, that she was simply incapable of functioning effectively as governor, for example due to ineradicable stupidity, then resigning would be justified. However, she did not appear to believe that, and, although the residents of Alaska will probably benefit by her leaving, they still should feel betrayed by her breaking of an implicit promise.

The implicit promise to serve out one's term in office, however, is not the sole responsibility one has as a public figure. One also has a responsibility to serve one's country and one's constituents as effectively as possible. It is as obvious as anything could be that Obama can serve the people of Illinois more effectively as President than he could as Senator. So, Obama's responsibility to his constituents outweighs his responsibilities as Senator. To belabor the point: if I agree to take my wife out to dinner, but, while I am on the way to the KFC, she goes into labor, I should not continue to act on my original promise but to drive to the hospital instead. So, Obama's taking a new job as President is acceptable.

It is a bit less obvious that, say, Kathleen Sebelius taking the job as Secretary of Health and Human Services fits this model of obligation. But I think a reasonable case can be made that this is a legitimate promotion in which position she could benefit her constituents and as well as other Americans. We have responsibilities to others besides the one we made our promise to, and those responsibilities can take precedence as well. So, if Sebelius had good reason to think that she could benefit others significantly in the new post, then she could have a responsibility to take a new job.

In short, accepting a promotion is not the same thing as quitting. Obama's and Palin's resignations are not the same; this meme ought to die painfully. And Kristol should stop bullshitting about it.

Obama's Insensitive Remarks

Barack Obama's remarks about the arrest of Henry Louis Gates, noted African American scholar and Harvard university professor, have quite rightly received criticism for impugning the good men and women serving in police forces not just in Cambridge, Massachusetts, but around the United States. Rep. Thaddeus McCotter (R-MI) has authored a resolution demanding Obama apologize for his intemperate remarks. And Steve Killian, president of the Cambridge Police Patrol Officer's Association demanded an apology to all police personnel, "The president should make an apology to all law enforcement personnel throughout the entire country who took offense to this."

Indeed, what could be more intemperate than saying that the police acted "stupidly" in arresting someone for being in his own home without proper police authorization. It's a good thing that members of the Republican party are never given to criticism or hyperbole in their public statements. But the legitimacy of these criticisms notwithstanding, this criticism of Obama is too narrow. Demands that Obama apologize to all police officers in America is far too narrow. After all, if one must apologize to all police officers for criticizing a single police officer, it must also be true that Obama should apologize not only to all carbon-based lifeforms, since Officer Crowley was clearly carbon-based, but to all physical objects in the entire universe since Crowley is also a physical object that occupies part of the universe.

One might think that this response is extreme, that Obama clearly has no need to apologize personally to the occupants of Deneb 7 (should there be such a place), but the logic is inexorable. Whenever you criticize one member of a class of individuals, you have, by extension, criticized every member of that class.

So, the ball is in Obama's court. Will he personally apologize to every physical object in the universe? Or is he a pusillanimous cad who will not take responsibility for his statements? I look forward to increased funding for manned space flight.